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NAFTA'S PROPOSED TRI-LATERAL COMMISSIONS ON
THE ENVIRONMENT AND LABOR
RONALD W. KLEINMAN, ESQ., JOEL M. SHAPIRO, ESQ.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article details the legal institutions and arrangements created by
the side agreements to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
Like NAFTA itself, the side agreements have become the object of
intense controversy and lobbying on both sides of the issue. But the
turmoil surrounding these accords was not inevitable. In fact, while it
may seem hard to remember now, NAFTA began without much controversy.

A.

Birth of the Side Agreements

The awakening of the American public to the ramifications of NAFTA
(real or imagined) coincided with the 1992 Presidential Election. Not
surprisingly, NAFTA became an important issue in the 1992 campaign.
Ultimately, Candidate Clinton supported the agreement, but only on the
condition that side agreements be negotiated to address and relieve NAFTA's impact on labor and the environment (as well as an agreement on
import surges). Mr. Clinton outlined his position on NAFTA, including
his insistence on negotiating the side accords, in an October 4 speech in
Raleigh, North Carolina. In November he was elected President.'
With the new administration in place, the proposed side agreements
became a matter of immediate concern. With NAFTA already embodied
in an agreement signed on August 12 of the previous year, the only
remaining stumbling block to submission of the agreement for fast-track
consideration was completion of three side agreements. The negotiations
began in early 1993 and continued through the summer. Finally, in August,
Mr. Clinton was in a position to sign the agreements. In the meantime,
however, political momentum had been lost to NAFTA opponents.
Ironically, the side agreements themselves have been attacked by the
very interest groups they were designed to assuage. These groups argue
that the agreements miss the target because they do not themselves establish
enforceable norms. That is unquestionably true, and as discussed below,
the agreements are far more procedural than substantive. Moreover, critics
* Mr. Kleinman and Mr. Shapiro are associates in the Washington, D.C. office of Weil,
Gotshal & Manges. Both specialize in international trade regulation. This article expresses the views
of the authors only and does not necessarily express the views of Weil, Gotshal & Manges or its
clients.
1. See Peter Behr, Clinton's Conversion on NAFTA, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1993, at HI.
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argue that even within this limited procedural scope, the agreements fail
to assure enforcement of environmental standards and labor rights. This
article agrees, however, that the side agreements have real significance
and value and should not be readily dismissed.
II.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT

The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation

1. Obligations
The labor accord is officially titled "the North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation." Under this Agreement, each- party commits to
set high labor standards, 2 to enforce labor laws, 3 to publish its labor
laws4 and to give due consideration to complaints of labor violations. 5
It also ensures judicial access and due process for private persons claiming
infringement of a Party's labor laws. 6 "Further procedural guarantees
include judicial review, 7 written decisions, 8 and impartial and independent
tribunals. "9
These commitments are process-oriented. The closest they come to
establishing norms-and therefore the most important aspect from a U.S.
political context-is the obligation to establish high labor standards and
enforce them. Critics point out that the Agreement expressly provides
that a Party has not failed to enforce its laws when an agency or official
chooses not to take action based on prosecutorial discretion or a bona
fide decision to allocate enforcement resources to higher priority violations. 10 This provision has led to severe attack from U.S. labor organizations.
2. The Commission
To supervise the Parties' compliance with their obligations under the
Agreement, the labor accord creates the Commission for Labor Cooperation." The Commission consists of a Ministerial Council made up of
cabinet-level representatives from each Party and a permanent standing
Secretariat.' 2 The Commission is assisted in its efforts by each Party's
National Administrative Office, or NAO. 13

2. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, U.S.-Can-Mex., art. 2
[hereinafter NAALCI.
3. Id. art.3.1.

4. id.art.6.
5. Id.art. 3.2.
6. Id.arts.
4, 5.1(a).
7. Id. art.5.3.

8. Id.art. 5.2(a).
9. Id. art.5.4.
Id. arts.3.1, 49.1.

tO.

II. Id.art.8.1.
12. Id. arts.8.2, 9.1

13. Id.art. 8.2.
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The Ministerial Council governs the overall Commission. The Council
will meet at least once every year and will be chaired successively by
each Party.' 4 The Council's functions include overseeing implementation
of the Agreement, making recommendations on developing the Agreement,
the pact, 5
directing the Secretariat and working groups established under
6
and promoting cooperative activities between the Parties.'
Under the Agreement, a Secretariat will be established to assist the
Council in exercising its functions,t 7 including preparation of reports on
labor laws, trends and conditions using publicly available information
supplied by the Parties.' 8 The Secretariat also may prepare reports on
any matter requested by the Council.' 9
Before publication, all reports must be submitted to the Council for
authorization to publish, subject to remand for further work if the Council
20
considers a report materially inaccurate or otherwise deficient. Secretariat
reports and studies will be made public if the Council approves them.'
Critics complain that this assures that politically embarrassing or controversial reports will be swept from public view.
Political control over the Secretariat appears to be limited, however,
by the Secretariat's rules of operation created under the Agreement, rules
designed to promote evenhandedness in discharging the Secretariat's duties.
The Secretariat will be led by an Executive Director appointed by the
Council. 2 This position will rotate consecutively between nationals of
each Party. All hiring decisions will be based on merit and will reflect
due regard for maintaining an equal balance of members from each
Party. 23 Finally, the Executive Director is to act independently of any
external to the Council2 4 and the Council
governmental or other authority
25
cause.
for
may remove him
Each Party is also required to establish a National Administrative
Office to serve as a point of contact between the Parties and provide
26
publicly available information requested under the Agreement. Further,
NAO
Party's
any Party's NAO may request consultations with any other
27
on
advise
To
territory.
Party's
other
on labor-related matters in the
also
may
Party
each
Agreement,
the
of
elaboration
and
implementation
convene a National Advisory Committee of citizens 28 or a government

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. art. 9.3.
Id. art. 10.1.
Id. art. 11.1.
Id. art. 13.1.
Id. art. 14.1.
Id. art. 14.2.
Id. art. 14.3.
Id. art. 14.4.
Id.art. 12.1.
Id.arts. 12.2(a), 12.2(c).
Id. art. 12.5.
Id.art. 12.1.
Id.arts. 16.1, 16.2.
Id.art. 21.1.
Id.art. 17.

U.S. -MEXICO

LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 2

committee of federal, state or local officials. 29 Thus, if ultimately dissatisfied with the public pronouncements of the Commission, U.S., Canadian and Mexican labor interests will certainly have the forum and
opportunity to air grievances.
3. Dispute Resolution
(a) General Procedures
Like NAFTA itself, the labor accord provides for dispute resolution.
In the event a Party's compliance comes into issue, any Party may request
Ministerial level consultations. 0 If this fails to resolve the matter, then
the consulting Parties may request formation of an Evaluation Committee
of Experts (ECE).3 ' An ECE will only be convened if an independent
expert determines that the matter2 is either trade related or covered by
mutually recognized labor laws.1
Other procedures require the submission of a written report to the
Council by the ECE of action taken.33 Parties may respond in writing
to a draft report, which the ECE must consider when preparing its final
report.3 4 The Parties also may submit to the Council, in writing, their
views of the ECE's final report." The Council is directed to publish the
report within 30 days.3 6 The Council must also consider the final report,7
and the Parties' written responses to it, but no other action is required.
For most disputes, an ECE report is the end of the line. For disputes
involving the right to strike, unionize and bargain collectively, not even
an ECE can be formed-only Ministerial level consultations are permitted.
But for a select group of matters-those involving occupational safety
and health, child labor and minimum wage-expanded dispute resolution
is available. Following an ECE final report addressing these areas, any
Party may request consultations to consider whether a Party has demonstrated a "persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce such
standards." 3"
If consultations fail to resolve the matter, a Party may request a special
session of the Council.3 9 If that session does not settle the matter, an
arbitral panel can be convened by a two-thirds vote of the Council, but
only if the Council decides the dispute involves a standard that
is both
4
trade related and covered by mutually recognized labor laws. 0

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

18.
22.1.
23.1.
23.3 & annex 23.1.
25.1.
25.2.
26.3.
26.2.
26.4.
27.1.
28.1.
29.1.
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Procedures provide for submission of an initial report containing factual
findings, followed by a decision on the merits and a plan of action for
redressing non-enforcement. 4' If the Parties fail to agree on a plan of
action corresponding to the plan proposed in the report, 4 any disputing
43
Party can ask that the panel be reconvened to consider this failure.
(b) Monetary Fines and Sanctions
One might draw from this description that the Agreement is toothless,
and so its critics charge. But in fact, at this point the Agreement takes
an imaginative-and unprecedented-step: the imposition of a monetary
fine. The Agreement expressly provides that, for failure to implement
an action plan, fines may be imposed, not to exceed $20 million for the
first year the Agreement is in force or .00701o of total trade in goods
between the Parties thereafter for the most recent year in which data
are available. 44 Never before has the United States agreed to the imposition
of monetary payments for failure to meet its obligations under a treaty
or to provide itself with a remedy if its treaty partner is in breach.
(c) Suspension of Trade Benefits as Sanctions
The Agreement also addresses remedies for failure to pay fines. A
Party may suspend NAFTA trade benefits to collect a monetary fine or
to punish a Party found not to be implementing an action plan fully.45
When used to collect a fine, the value of suspended benefits cannot
exceed the value of unpaid fines." If a panel decides the fine has been
paid or an action plan has been implemented, then suspension of benefits
must be lifted. 47 The panel also may reconvene on written request of a
excessive.
Party and decide whether a suspension of benefits is manifestly
4
The panel will report its findings to the disputing Parties. 8
Again, this provision in a labor agreement appears to be unprecedented.
The United States has never agreed by treaty to the suspension of trade
privileges for failure to meet labor standards. 49 Indeed, trade and labor
commitments have rarely, if ever, been directly linked in a single agreement.
(d) Special Rules for Canada
In Canada's case, no fines or suspensions are available to force Canadian compliance with a panel report. Instead, under the Agreement

41. Id. art. 36.2.
42. Id. art. 38.
43. Id. art. 39.1.
44. Id.annex 39.
45. Id. art. 41.1 & annex 41B.
46. Id. art. 41.2.
47. Id. art. 41.4.
48. Id. art. 41.5.
49. To date, the most comparable U.S. action is the refusal to extend unilateral trade concessions
to countries violating internationally recognized worker rights. See 19 U.S.C. 2462(a) (1984) (Generalized System of Preferences); 19 U.S.C. § 2702 (1983) (Caribbean Basin Initiative).
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Canada guarantees that panel determinations can be made orders of its
domestic court and enforceable as such.50 This arrangement was made
at Canada's insistence because of that country's open opposition to U.S.
trade sanctions, which it considers abusive and a barrier to trade.
4. Evaluation of Criticisms of the Labor Accord
Although critics complain that the enforcement provisions of these
agreements do not go far enough in protecting workers' rights, they go
farther than other trade agreements in enforcing those rights. In fact,
the labor agreement goes farther than most labor treaties in enforcing
workers' rights.
If nothing else, these provisions provide a forum and process for
exposing nonenforcement and directing attention to it. NAFTA panels
or NAOs are not the way for Mexico or any Party to be forced to
enforce its labor laws. But as drafted, the NAFTA side agreements should
encourage self-enforcement, at least to the extent the Parties will want
to avoid public disputes over worker rights, and will provide an opportunity for aggrieved parties to air complaints.
B.

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
The preceding section offers a general framework for operation of the
labor agreement. The Environmental Accord is generally structured along
these same lines, although the Environmental Accord is arguably more
developed and has sharper teeth.
1. Obligations
Under the Pact, each Party is obligated to set high levels of environ-2
mental protection,' publish its environmental laws and enforce them.1
As in the Labor Accord, a party may be excused for nonenforcement
through prosecutorial discretion or a bona fide decision to allocate resources to higher priority violations." Private access to remedies and
procedural guarantees are also provided for in the Environmental Accord., 4
The Parties also agree to explicit environmental undertakings for which
there are no analogues in the Labor Accord. The Parties promise to
consider complying with Council recommendations on pollution controls
and to consider banning export to another Party of pesticides or toxic
substances whose use is banned in its own territory.5"

50.
51.
art. 3
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. annex 41A.
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, U.S.-Can-Mex.,
[herinafter NAAEC1.
Id. arts. 4, 5.
Id. arts. 5.1, 45.1.
id. arts. 6, 7.
id. arts. 2.2, 2.3, 10.5(b).
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2. The Commission
Like its labor counterpart, the Environmental Agreement establishes a
Commission, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation.16 The Commission includes a Council consisting of cabinet-level officers (for the
U.S., the EPA Administrator) or 7their designees, a Secretariat and a
Joint Public Advisory Committee.
The Council's functions include those listed for the Labor Agreement
Council, such as overseeing the Secretariat and making recommendations
on the further elaboration of the Agreement. 8 The Environmental Council
is also directed to take steps beyond those in the Labor Agreement,
including promoting the environmental objectives of NAFTA,19 developing
with the Parties' consent a system of assessing the environmental impact
of proposed projects subject to government approval, 6° and making recommendations on how each Party can improve its judicial access for
non-nationals injured or likely to be injured from pollution created in
the Party's territory. 6' The Council is further directed to make recommendations on pollution abatement
techniques, scientific data gathering,
62
conservation, and similar issues.

The Environmental Secretariat is also similar in structure and function
to its Labor Agreement counterpart. As in the Labor Accord, the Agreement provides for an Executive Director., Unlike the Labor Secretariat
(which will have only 15 staff members)," however, the Environmental
Secretariat is not limited in its staff size. The Secretariat will prepare
annual reports subject to Council review65 and report on any matter
within the scope of the annual program, although such matters may not
include the nonenforcement of domestic environmental law or regulations." Investigating the nonenforcement of domestic environmental law
is left to dispute settlement panels.
The Secretariat may consider submissions from a person or a nongovernmental organization (NGO) alleging ineffective enforcement of environmental laws, but only if set criteria are met. 67 The Secretariat shall
prepare factual records based on such submissions only if two-thirds of
the Parties so instruct after a request from the Secretariat. 68 If two-thirds
of the Parties agree, the Secretariat will make the factual record publicly

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
arts.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

8.1.
8.2. 9.1.
10.1.
10.6.
10.7.
10.9.
10.2.
11.1.
12.3.
12.1.
13.1.
14.1.
15.2.
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available. 69 Similar powers of investigation are not vested in the Labor
Secretariat.
As in the Labor Agreement, each Party may convene a National
Advisory Committee, or NAC.' 0 A Joint Public Advisory Committee,
however, is an additional body provided for in the Environmental
Agreement 7" but not in the Labor Accord. Each Party or its NAC will
appoint an equal number of members. 2 The Joint Committee's purpose
is to provide advice to the Council on any matter within the 7scope
of
4
the Agreement 73 and to provide information to the Secretariat. '
3. Dispute Resolution
As in the Labor Agreement, the Environmental Pact includes detailed
dispute resolution provisions. Any dispute settlement process must start
with consultations of the same type as in the Labor Agreement. The
Environmental Pact authorizes any Party to inform another Party of
alleged violations of environmental laws and also to allow the offending
Party to investigate. 75 For these purposes, the term "environmental laws"
refer to laws regulating pollution, toxic substances and protection of
flora and fauna, but not laws whose primary purpose is managing commercial harvest or exploitation, or subsistence or aboriginal harvesting
of natural resources.' 6 This limit on the scope of protection is viewed
by many in the green movement as a serious failing of the pact.
If the Parties fail to settle the matter, a disputing Party may request
the intervention of the Council. Failing Council resolution of the dispute,
an arbitral panel will be convened if by a two-thirds vote of the Council
the matter is determined to relate to a persistent pattern of failure to
effectively enforce an environmental law that "relates to a situation
involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or
provide services traded between Parties or that compete with goods
produced and services provided by another Party." 77 Finally, the panel
is directed to act within specified
time frames in issuing an initial report,
78
final report and action plan.
4. Fines and Sanctions
The Environmental Pact also provides for fines and sanctions.' 9 Like
those provided for in the Labor Accord, these enforcement techniques
are unprecedented. For the first time, the United States has sought, and

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. art. 15.7.
Id. art.17.
Id. art.16.
Id. art.16.1.
Id. art.16.4.
Id. art.16.5.
Id. art.20.4.
Id. art.
45.2.
Id.art.24.1.
Id.arts.
31-35.
Id.art.36.

SYMPOSIUM 19941

PROPOSED TRI-LATERAL COMMISSIONS

agreed to in this agreement, the potential imposition of generalized trade
sanctions to enforce compliance with a highly specialized environmental
agreement.
C. Extent of Application of Obligations Under Labor and
Environmental Agreements
As between Mexico and the United States, obligations of the side
agreements apply at all levels of government. With respect to Canada
special rules (even beyond those discussed above regarding fines and
sanctions) will apply because ratification by the federal government will
not bind the provinces, and some of those provinces may not sign on
to the agreements. Indeed, after the recent election, that seems to be
near-certain. Because Canada should not enjoy the benefits of dispute
resolution without its burdens, the following special rules of application
have been fashioned.
Canada cannot sue or be sued under either accord regarding matters
which happened in Canada and would be under provincial jurisdiction
unless certain conditions apply.80 The Environmental Pact will apply to
Canada's provincial governments only if provinces subscribing to the
Agreement represent at least 55 percent of Canada's GDP for the most
recent year in which data are available. 8' The Labor Pact will apply to
Canada's provincial governments only if provinces subscribing to the
Labor Agreement account for at least 35 percent of Canada's
labor force
2
for the most recent year in which data are available.1
If the matter concerns a specific industry or sector, provinces subscribing
to the Environmental Agreement must represent at least 55 percent of
total Canadian production in that industry or sector for the most recent
year in which data are available, or the Environmental Pact will not
apply.8 3 For the Labor Pact to apply in industry-specific cases, provinces
subscribing to the Agreement must8 4represent at least 55 percent of the
workers in that industry or sector.
II. SEEDS OF CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES:
PERCEIVED FLAWS AND STRENGTHS OF THE LABOR AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS
A.

Critiques of Environmental and Labor Groups
The Labor Accord has been castigated more for what it does not do
than for what it does. The Pact DOES NOT:
* provide remedies for all types of labor law;

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. annex 41; see also NAALC, supra note 2, annex 46.
NAAEC, supra note 50, annex 41.4.
NAALC, supra note 2, annex 46.4.
NAAEC, supra note 50, annex 41.4.
NAALC, supra note 2, annex 46.4.
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* allow the Secretariat to prepare or publish a report without the
council's approval;
" allow the Secretariat to request a Panel; or
" make labor law.
The Environmental Accord also has been criticized more for what it
does not do than for what it does. The Pact DOES NOT:
* protect the environment against exploitation of natural resources;
* allow the Secretariat to prepare and publish a factual record unless
two-thirds of the Parties agree;
" allow the Secretariat to request a Panel;
" allow the Secretariat to freely accept submissions from private
parties; or
* make environmental law.
Despite these flaws and shortcomings, the side pacts represent an
unprecedented use of trade agreements to address trade-related social,
labor and environmental issues. 85 Historically, the United States has limited
trade agreements strictly to trade issues. Merely including environmental
and labor cooperation provisions represents a departure from set U.S.
practice. No similar provisions appear in the Canadian Free Trade Agreement.
B.

Countercriticisms: Infringing Sovereignty
Establishment of supra-national bodies to enforce the agreements is
another major departure from U.S. practice in trade agreements. Historically, the United States has objected to international organizations
established to oversee and interfere in trade issues. This policy dates back
at least to the GATT in 1948, when the United States refused to establish
the International Trade Organization to oversee the GATT and enforce
its terms.
Therefore, the labor and environmental Commissions included in the
NAFTA side deals, with their standing Secretariats, have provided fodder
for Congressional and public critics charging that these Commissions
represent a threat to U.S. sovereignty. It may seem ironic, but the steps
taken by the Clinton Administration to establish independent watchdogs
over environmental and labor issues have at the same time failed to
assuage labor and environmental activists (who claim that these groups
have no power) and yet activated conservative groups (who claim they
have too much).
IV.

CONCLUSION: PROSPECT FOR U.S. IMPLEMENTATION
OF NAFTA

If used effectively, these agreements can lead to the intended goals of
their proponents in the environmental and labor movements. But this

85. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (Sept.
29, 1993) (statement of Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator).
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would involve a political commitment by the Parties, and labor and the
green movement are skeptical that such political will can be relied upon
in the long run. Ultimately, the agreements may fail to guarantee new
standards of conduct, but they provide tools which could lead to such
standards in practice. While they may not live up to the early expectations
of the Clinton campaign, these agreements can not and should not be
dismissed as irrelevancies. In any event, they may presage future U.S.
trade policy, which will now have to recognize and factor in the political
reality of a more complicated (and perhaps volatile) blend of the traditional
trade agreement issues with new-age environmental and labor concerns
which were never before a part of the equation.

